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When the Intellectual Property Redux conference 
was first announced two or so years ago, I remember 
having both a positive and negative reaction. The positive 
reaction was, "Wow, what a great idea for a conference." 
The negative reaction was, "Oh man, why didn't I think of 
it first?" But now that I have been included, all negative 
thoughts have washed away. 
* Professor of Law and Austin Owen Research Scholar, University of 
Richmond School of Law. I would like to thank Ann Bartow for 
including me in the Intellectual Property Redux conference, Corinna 
Lain for editing this essay (and just about everything else I've ever 
written), and Jane Savoca for being my own Fortuna Redux. 
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The article I am here to revisit is Risk Aversion and 
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 1 which was 
published in 2007. I'm going to give a brief recap of the 
thesis and then tum to a few things I got wrong, some 
subsequent scholarship, various developments in practice, 
and the airing of grievances. 
I. RECAP OF ARGUMENT 
First, the recap. If I had to sum up the article's 
thesis in one sentence, it would be this: licensing is not only 
an output of the system of entitlements that intellectual 
property law creates, but an input into that system as 
well-and current law skews that input in ways that lead to 
the expansion of intellectual property entitlements in 
copyright and trademark over time. 
I was hardly the first scholar to observe that 
intellectual property entitlements had expanded, or that 
much of the expansion was unwarranted. But most of the 
prior commentary had focused on legislative capture and 
court decisions. In other words, it portrayed a purposeful 
expansion, fueled by rightsholders and manifested in the 
positive law. 
In contrast, I focused on a more inadvertent, organic 
expansion that could be found in both copyright and 
trademark. My thesis was that in certain vital contexts, the 
expansion had more to do with the structural indeterminacy 
of important intellectual property doctrines than with 
conscious policy or political decisions by legislators and 
judges. That is, even if the statutes were left unamended 
for years on end and no cases made it to court, copyright 
and trademark rights would expand over time through an 
1 James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual 
Property Law, 116 YALEL.J. 882 (2007). 
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incremental and mostly inadvertent process of accretion. 
The term "accretion" was important; the expansion happens 
over time, small piece by small piece, like a coral reef 
Indeed, looking back, I wish I'd called the article Rights 
Accretion and Risk Aversion in Intellectual Property Law, 
not Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual 
Property Law, because I think the rights accretion part was 
more important and that I made some mistakes in my 
discussion of the role of risk. 
I'll get to my mistakes later, but first back to the 
recap. It's easiest to understand my idea using copyright 
law. My premises, which at the time were pretty 
uncontroversial, were as follows. 
First, important doctrines in copyright law are 
notoriously indeterminate. These include substantial 
similarity, the idea/expression dichotomy, and (most 
important) fair use.2 As a result, it can be very difficult to 
determine ahead of time whether a given act of copying is 
infringing. Gray areas abound. 
Second, for the user of copyrighted material, the 
mere threat of an infringement case can be daunting. The 
strong possibility of injunctive relief, including preliminary 
injunctions, could halt a project in its tracks, very 
expensively, creating holdup power. And the specter of 
statutory damages also gave rightsholders a lot of 
leverage. 3 
Finally, there are often multiple players on the 
copyright-user side of a licensing transaction. For example, 
a documentary filmmaker who wants to use a copyrighted 
2 Id. at 888-91. 
3 Id. at 890, 942-45. 
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photograph in her film must consider not only the copyright 
holder, but also the film's errors and omissions insurer, her 
producers, future distributors, downstream broadcasters, 
and so on. These parties tend to approach legal issues very 
conservatively, particularly when the legal issue has the 
potential to destroy or delay the entire project. This brings 
us to the risk aversion part of the thesis: all these 
constituents would pressure copyright users like our 
filmmaker to pay a little now rather than risk paying a lot 
later. 4 
In combination, these premises led to the conclusion 
(also uncontroversial) that when copyright users 
incorporate existing copyrighted material into their new 
project, they usually get permission and pay a licensing fee 
rather than risk litigation over substantial similarity, fair 
use, etc. and face the threat of an injunction and statutory 
damages. 5 It's called a "clearance culture."6 License, don't 
litigate. Better safe than sued. 
The final ingredient in my argument, which I called 
"doctrinal feedback," emerged from the fair use doctrine. 
The most important fair use factor is the effect of the 
defendant's use on the rightsholder' s market. 7 But this 
4 Id. at 890-94. 
5 Id. at 894-95. 
6 See, e.g., PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR Soc. 
MEDIA, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS 
CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS (2005). 
7 This factor is found at 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012). For proof of its 
importance, see, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539, 566-67 (1985); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. 
Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir. 1996); Triangle 
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 
(5th Cir. 1980); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
COPYRIGHT§ 13.05[A][4] (2019) ("If one looks to the fair use cases, if 
not always to their stated rationale, this emerges as the most important, 
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factor is subject to circular reasoning: until we decide 
whether the defendant's use is fair, it's impossible to say 
that the plaintiff has any right to exploit the market that the 
defendant's use represents. Copyright law tries to avoid 
this circularity by focusing only on real markets-e.g., 
markets that already exist or that the copyright owner is 
likely to develop. 8 
If you put this all together, you can see the problem. 
It works like this. In Year One, I want to make use of your 
copyrighted work. There is no established licensing market 
for my use, so although I'm in a gray area, I figure that I 
have a good shot-we'll peg it at eighty percent-at a fair 
use defense. But that still leaves a twenty percent chance 
the use might be ruled infringing. With all the dire 
consequences that come with infringement, and with all the 
pressure I am feeling from my insurer, distributor, etc., I 
decide not to take that chance; I get a license from you 
instead. Over time, other similarly situated actors follow 
suit. So by Year Three, bit by bit, there has emerged a 
widespread, active licensing market for the kind of use in 
which I engaged. This means that in Year Four, the 
chances of winning a fair use argument for that use have 
and indeed, central fair use factor." (footnotes omitted)); Barton Beebe, 
An Empirical Study of the U.S. Copyright Fair Use Cases, 1978-2005, 
156 U. PENN. L. REV. 549, 617 (2008) (showing empirically that 
winning the fourth-factor argument corresponds highly to winning the 
entire fair use argument and arguing that it "essentially constitutes a 
metafactor under which courts integrate their analyses of the other three 
factors and, in doing so, arrive at the outcome not simply of the fourth 
factor, but of the overall test."). 
8 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) 
(suggesting that courts focus on markets "that creators of original 
works would in general develop or license others to develop"); Am. 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(suggesting that courts focus on markets that are "traditional, 
reasonable, or likely to be developed"). 
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dropped considerably (because the existence of the 
licensing market militates against a fair use finding). So 
now the use that was eighty percent/twenty percent in favor 
of fair use is more like twenty percent/eighty percent 
against. The risk-averse preference for licensing has fed 
back around into the doctrinal analysis and the reach of 
copyright rights has expanded. And because fair use has 
narrowed, a use that would have been a one hundred 
percent slam dunk for fair use five years earlier is now 
more like eighty percent/twenty percent, and the user may 
now start thinking about a license, and the whole cycle 
starts again. 9 Again, licensing is both an input and an 
output in the copyright system. 
The same input/output dynamic is present in 
trademark law, although it's a little more situational, so I'll 
run through it quickly. Trademark's consumer confusion 
standard can be very hard to apply in nontraditional 
contexts, like the appearance of a trademarked good in a 
video or film. It does not help that courts use a wide 
variety of terminology when articulating the kind of 
confusion that's actionable, from the Lanham Act's 
"sponsorship" and "approval" terminology, to whether the 
relationship between the parties is one of endorsement, 
affiliation, associat10n, connection, authorization, 
perm1ss1on, or license, to whether the use produced 
confusion "of any kind." Attached to these descriptors 
comes a host of catch-all modifiers, selected precisely for 
their imprecision: Was there confusion as to whether the 
mark owner "otherwise" approved or was "in some other 
way" connected? Was there a relationship "of some sort" 
or a suggestion that the defendant's product emanated "in 
9 Gibson, supra note 1, at 898-900. 
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some way" from the mark owner? Will consumers "in 
some fashion" associate the plaintiff and defendant? 10 
As those terms suggest, consumer confusion will 
largely be a function of consumer understandings of when a 
license is needed. And consumers do indeed become aware 
of these licensing practices in subtle ways. For example, 
everyone has seen reality shows and music videos that 
routinely "blur out" certain logos and other trademarks, 
presumably because the producers were unable to get the 
relevant license. The absence of any "blurring out" thus 
becomes more significant-it implies at the very least that 
permission has been given, and it is a short hop from 
permission to affiliation or endorsement. The increasing 
incidence of merchandising and product placement may 
play a role here too: as consumers come to understand that 
a brand often appears in a toy or movie because of a 
financial deal between the filmmaker and the brand owner 
(e.g., James Bond doesn't drive a BMW by coincidence), 
they will start to assume that any such appearance 
represents a deal with, and thus a tacit endorsement by, the 
brand owner. This in tum allows the brand owner to sue 
filmmakers who use brands without permission under a 
consumer confusion theory, which in tum causes more 
conservative licensing practices, and so on. 11 Thus we see 
doctrinal feedback of the trademark variety. 
10 Id. at 908-12. 
11 Id. at 915-23. The behavioral sciences have a name for consumers' 
understanding of the promotional nature of the marketing efforts that 
bombard them and their ability to appreciate and manage their own 
reactions thereto. It is called "persuasion knowledge," and my article 
went into it in some detail. See id. Indeed, in an early draft of the 
article, I claimed to be the first to use the concept of persuasion 
knowledge in legal scholarship. Barton Beebe saved me from 
including this claim in the final version by pointing me to an earlier 
article: Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 2020 (2005). I was embarrassed to have missed that 
Volume 60- Number 1 
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II. ERRORS 
So that's the basic argument of the article. I went 
on to suggest some possible solutions, but here I'd like to 
focus instead on things I got wrong. 
A. Accounting for Risk 
I can think of two errors I made in the way the 
article accounted for risk. The first is that I completely 
ignored the insights from prospect theory and other sources 
about how risk is perceived and addressed in the real 
world. 12 In short, I oversimplified by assuming risk 
aversion on the part of users of copyrighted works and 
trademarked goods. As Steven Horowitz and Andres 
Sawicki later pointed out, copyright users may in fact be 
more risk-seeking than the rest of the population. 13 
The second mistake I made about risk may have 
inadvertently fixed the first mistake: I overemphasized the 
importance of risk aversion in the doctrinal feedback 
dynamic. 14 Most of what I proposed worked perfectly fine 
even when the user was not risk-averse. After all, there are 
lots of costs to litigating that would push a perfectly 
piece in my research, but I would have been more embarrassed to have 
published the claim, so I remain grateful to Barton for this tip, which he 
delivered more graciously and diplomatically than I deserved. 
12 The foundational article is Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
13 Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright's Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 331 (2012); Andres Sawicki, Risky IP, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 81 
(2016). 
14 I claim no credit for making one mistake that balances out another. 
As a very wise man once said, "The designer of such a system looks 
more like Rube Goldberg than Vilfredo Pareto." See James 
Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 1641, 1699 (2008). 
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rational decisionmaker toward licensing. First, of course, 
there are the litigation costs themselves; I don't know of 
any empirical studies that show how often attorney's fees 
are awarded to the prevailing party, but from an ex ante 
perspective I would not be confident in predicting such an 
outcome for a client that was considering litigating one of 
these indeterminate doctrines. So even a successful 
defense would probably cost the defendant its attorney's 
fees. Second, the holdup power that comes with an 
injunction (especially a preliminary injunction) can be 
significant, whether you're risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-
seeking. Third, in many copyright cases statutory damages 
would be available, which will usually increase the 
exposure for losing the case by an order of magnitude or 
two above licensing costs. 15 Finally, when someone wins a 
fair use case, he or she externalizes a lot of the benefits16-
which I like as an academic, but which would push me 
toward licensing as a user. Faced with these 
considerations, even a risk-neutral or risk-seeking party 
might lean toward licensing. 
I said as much in the article, 17 but I breezed by it 
and moved quickly to focus on risk-averse parties. And 
15 This is not to say that statutory damages would always be awarded; 
Ben Depoorter has recently done some excellent empirical work that 
shows this is not the case. See Ben Depoorter, Copyright Enforcement 
in the Digital Age: When the Remedy Is the Wrong, 66 UCLA L. REV. 
400 (2019). But because statutory damages are supracompensatory, 
even a low risk of an award will matter to a risk-neutral defendant. 
16 These externalities can take many forms, one of which is that a fair 
use ruling provides value to third parties who may have their own fair 
use questions in the future. Gibson, supra note 1, at 940-41. Another 
is that fair use exists in part to allow a user to proceed with a use that 
confers benefits on third parties. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining 
the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright 
Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 49-53 (1997). 
17 Gibson, supra note 1, at 890-901 (copyright), 925 (trademark). 
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putting "risk aversion" in the article's ti t1 e naturally 
suggested that it was a necessary part of the equation rather 
than something that would exacerbate an already existing 
tendency. (Here, years later, I've left "Risk Aversion" out 
of the title of this article. There-all fixed!) 
B. Collective Action Solutions 
The other major error I made in the article is 
something I am happy to have gotten wrong. My article 
described what is essentially a prisoner's dilemma. In 
theory, to stop rights accretion, all similarly situated users 
could get together and agree not to seek licenses for a given 
kind of use. 18 In practice, I thought this presented an 
intractable collective action problem, especially when one 
considers that they'd not only have to agree with each 
other, but also convince the other interested parties on their 
sides of the transaction-insurers, distributors, 
broadcasters, etc.-to buy into the decision not to license. 19 
I was mistaken. Certain groups of copyright users 
have indeed managed to get together and solve these 
challenges, under the leadership of Patricia Aufderheide at 
American University (with help from Peter Jaszi). It 
started with documentary filmmakers, who created a very 
detailed and very reasonable Documentary Filmmakers' 
Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use. 20 That was not too 
significant in and of itself, but they also got the other 
interested parties, such as their insurers, to buy into the 
statement. Pat and friends then followed with similar codes 
18 Id. at 903. 
19 Id. 
20 
Ass'N OF INDEPENDENT VIDEO & FILMMAKERS ET AL., DOCUMENT-
ARY FILMMAKERS' STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE 
(2005), https :/ /ems impact. org/ code/documentary-filmmakers-statement 
-of-best-practices-in-fair-use [https:/ /perma.cc/GML 7-KA WE]. 
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for journalism, online video, course syllabi, museums, 
visual arts, media literacy education, and academic and 
research libraries. 21 I don't know whether each of these 
codes has fully penetrated the corresponding industry, but 
at least in the documentary world they seem to have had a 
real impact. 
If I'm talking about collective action solutions, I 
should do another shout-out. Around the time that I wrote 
my article, Wendy Seltzer (now at the World Wide Web 
Consortium) was doing some interesting work on takedown 
practices. 22 The site she founded (originally known as 
Chilling Effects, now known as Lumen)23 has been a great 
resource for those who want to push back against 
overreaching rightsholders-which is one way of 
combating the doctrinal feedback that would come from 
giving in to overreach and licensing uses that don't need to 
be licensed. I'm not sure the site is a comprehensive 
solution to the rights accretion problem, but the first step in 
solving a collective action problem is collection, and the 
site is excellent at collection. 
Ill. SUBSEQUENT SCHOLARSHIP 
So those are some things I got wrong. I am sure 
there are more, but I want to shift to talking about 
subsequent scholarship related to the article, which I don't 
21 See Codes, CENTER FOR MEDIA & SOCIAL IMPACT, https://cmsimpac 
t.org/resources/codes [https://perma.cc/R3A J-LKRD] (last visited July 
14, 2019). 
22 See, e.g., Wendy Seltzer, The Politics of Internet Control and 
Delegated Censorship (2008), https:/ /papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=l496056 [https://perma.cc/9J YT-4QXB] (last visited July 
14, 2019). 
23 See LUMEN, https://www.lumendatabase.org [https://perma.cc/GER 
9-NH74] (last visited July 14, 2019). 
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think has proved me wrong, but which has introduced some 
things to think about that I didn't fully address. 
A. Pushback 
A number of scholars, in commenting on the article 
itself or in related work, have pushed back on some of my 
assumptions and conclusions. When my article was 
published, Rebecca Tushnet was kind enough to write a 
short accompanying piece, in which she pointed out several 
doctrines in trademark law (like functionality and 
descriptive fair use) that help combat the rights accretion 
problem that I identified. 24 And I think she is correct that 
trademark law has more readily available tools to fight 
rights accretion than copyright does-which may be one 
reason why rights accretion is less evident in trademark 
than in copyright-although whether either area of law has 
been effectively using those tools is a more troubling 
question. Certainly, the most recent development m 
copyright's functionality doctrine is not encouraging. 25 
Wendy Gordon also wrote a response, in which she 
pointed out ( among other things) that there are 
circumstances in which the market is simply not the place 
we look for appropriateness of licensing, even in the 
absence of risk aversion and doctrinal feedback. 26 Take the 
Sony Betamax case. 27 If that's a market failure case, then 
24 Rebecca Tushnet, Why the Customer Jsn 't Always Right: Producer-
Based Limits on Rights Accretion in Trademark, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET 
PART 352 (2007). 
25 See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 
1013 n.2 (2017) (holding that anything you can imagine can be 
copyrighted unless it's a shovel). 
26 Wendy J. Gordon, The "Why" of Markets: Fair Use and Circularity, 
116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 358 (2007). 
27 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
(1984). 
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maybe it's not good law anymore; in a world of Hulu and 
Netflix, the transaction costs of authorized home viewing 
are much lower than they were when the case was decided. 
But if it's a case about values that aren't market-
determined, like the right to do as you please in the privacy 
of your own home, then it's probably still good law. 28 
Wendy should know, having written the foundational 
article on fair use as market failure and its application to 
the Betamax case, 29 and I think she was right in her 
commentary on my article. I was focused on the way the 
licensing market creates the feedback loop, so I didn't 
attend as much to non-market values. In my defense, I did 
acknowledge those values when I reviewed possible 
solutions to rights accretion, 30 but I was looking for a 
solution that was more normatively neutral-one that 
would solve the problem without assuming any particular 
view of, say, privacy rights-so I dismissed them. 
The most sustained pushback against my thesis, 
however, came from a number of scholars, such as Pam 
Samuelson, Neil Netanel, and Matt Sag, who argue both 
theoretically and empirically that fair use is not so 
unpredictable. 31 They do so by categorizing fair use cases. 
28 See Gordon, supra note 26, at 360-61 (recognizing the argument 
that the Sony case was about "privacy and proper behavior" rather than 
pure economics). 
29 Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and 
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). 
30 Gibson, supra note 1, at 946 (recognizing that "some copyright 
commentators prize fair use because it protects certain ideals (e.g., 
privacy, free speech) that resist all market valuation, externalized or 
not."). 
31 Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012); 
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 
(2009); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS 
& CLARKL. REV. 715 (2011). 
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I think that work is very interesting and illuminates the 
changing nature of fair use, and particularly the way that 
transformative use has become one of the most important 
battles to win as a fair use litigant. But in the end, even 
after reading all those studies, I don't think fair use is more 
predictable. Take Matt's study, for example. We have to 
have a transformative use (itself a contested issue), plus 
partial copying, plus an individual as a defendant before we 
get to an eighty-seven percent chance to win-and we're 
still within a standard deviation of the seventies, which 
would give even a risk-neutral user pause. 32 And that's 
ignoring the selection bias that arises from looking at 
published cases only. 
In short, I think that Larry Lessig's quip from 
fifteen years ago-that the fair use right is so indeterminate 
that it's really just "the right to hire a lawyer"-is still 
correct today. 33 And even when you hire a lawyer, that 
lawyer is likely to advise you to license rather than litigate. 
In fact, I do some consulting work, and even with clients 
whose fair use cases I am pretty confident I could win in 
court, I have consistently advised them to get a license 
instead. I do this knowing full well that I am fueling the 
very dynamic that I complained about in my scholarship. 
The fact that I can confidently classify the case as 
transformative, or categorize it within a group of fair use 
cases involving similar factors, has not significantly 
affected the decision calculus that I use as a lawyer with 
my clients' interests in mind. 
Remember also that fair use is just one of the 
doctrines that leads to unpredictability about the need for a 
license. Substantial similarity is a moving target, as is 
32 Sag, supra note 31, at 79-80. 
33 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 187 (2004) ("[F]air use ... 
simply means the right to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create."). 
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idea/expression-consider the recent Blurred Lines and 
Led Zeppelin cases. 34 The feedback loop closes in fair use 
and its fourth-factor discussion of markets. But it does not 
necessarily begin in fair use; the uncertainty that prompts 
the license can originate in other indeterminate doctrines 
too. 
B. Follow-On Scholarship 
Now, about scholarship that expanded, rather than 
pushed back against, my central thesis. I only wrote one 
such article myself 35 In retrospect, it might have been 
better for my career if I had written a slew of follow-on 
articles that flogged the same horse. But honestly, after one 
or two articles on the same subject, I get bored. I want to 
learn about something new rather than become more expert 
in something familiar. So, true to form, I wrote one more 
article about doctrinal feedback and then went off to write 
about boilerplate contracts, 36 the death penalty, 37 and online 
platforms.38 (Not all in the same article.) 
34 Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018) (Blurred Lines 
case); Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2018), reh 'g 
en bane granted, 925 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2019). 
35 James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)Reasonable Care, 94 
VA. L. REV. 1641 (2008). 
36 James Gibson, Boilerplate's False Dichotomy, 106 GEO. L.J. 249 
(2018); James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
161 (2013). 
37 James Gibson & Corinna Barrett Lain, Death Penalty Drugs and the 
International Moral Marketplace, 103 GEO. L.J. 1215 (2015). 
38 Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, Higher Education and the 
DMCA, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2018); Christopher A. Cotropia & 
James Gibson, Convergence and Conflation in Online Copyright, 105 
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). Indeed, the only other intellectual 
property scholarship I have published since the Rights Accretion article 
is Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual 
Property's Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921 (2010), and Christopher 
A. Cotropia & James Gibson, Copyright's Topography: An Empirical 
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That said, one of the most gratifying things from my 
career as a law professor has been to see other scholars take 
my observations from the article and deploy them further-
sometimes in ways that I'd foreseen, but often in ways that 
I hadn't. It's a really nice example of how scholarship is 
supposed to work. All professors sometimes publish 
articles that seem to disappear into the ether, for reasons 
that may have nothing to do with the merits of the piece. 
So, when that doesn't happen, it's really rewarding-it 
restores one's faith in the weird "venture capital" system 
that is modem legal scholarship. 
I've already referred to some of this subsequent 
scholarship when I was discussing mistakes that I made and 
the people that identified and corrected those mistakes. 
When that happens, it's not quite as gratifying as seeing 
others elaborate on one's research, but it too is an important 
part of how we develop knowledge in the academy. And as 
I've already mentioned, the criticisms were mostly spot on, 
and in some cases solved problems that I wanted solved but 
didn't think could so easily be solved, so I was more than 
happy to be proved wrong. 
But back to the scholarship that has built off of the 
article in various ways. There have been articles that get at 
some of the moving parts of doctrinal feedback by trying to 
cabin overreaching rightsholders in various ways, like by 
imposing penalties for overreaching and regulating cease-
and-desist practices. 39 There have been articles that apply 
the theory to other areas of intellectual property, such as 
hot news, technological implementation of notice-and-
Study of Copyright Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1981 (2014), neither of 
which dealt with the doctrinal feedback phenomenon. 
39 E.g., Stacey Dogan, Bullying and Opportunism in Trademark and 
Right-of-Publicity Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1293 (2016). 
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takedown, and the right of publicity. 40 I think the fit with 
the right of publicity is particularly good, as I mentioned in 
an aside in the article. 41 That right has always been both 
amorphous and very dependent on public perceptions of 
what sort of uses of a person's persona require a license. I 
don't think it's any accident that Jennifer Rothman, who 
was doing similar work about the role of custom in 
intellectual property back when I wrote the article, 42 ended 
up as one of our premier experts on the right of publicity. 43 
There are very similar dynamics at play. 
I think there are also applications beyond 
intellectual property law that have mostly been unexplored. 
As I mentioned, I wrote one follow-on article myself, but it 
was not about intellectual property; it was on tort law. 44 
The idea was that negligence standards often draw on the 
custom in the relevant industry. Think medical 
malpractice. But if doctors are risk-averse, or are simply 
operating near the reasonable care line, there's a natural 
tendency to pile on more care so as to distance oneself from 
potential liability. That added care then becomes the 
custom that defines negligence, which means the line shifts 
and even more care is needed to stay clear of it. 45 Voila: 
doctrinal feedback. 
40 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, "Hot News": The Enduring Myth of 
Property in News, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 419, 434-35 (2011) (hot news); 
Noa Dreymann, John Doe's Right of Publicity, 32 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 673, 703 (2017) (right of publicity); Matthew Sag, Internet Safe 
Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93 NOTREDAMEL. 
REV. 499, 563 (2017) (notice-and-takedown). 
41 Gibson, supra note 1, at 914 n.126. 
42 See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in 
Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899 (2007). 
43 See JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY 
REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC WORLD (2018). 
44 Gibson, supra note 35. 
45 Id. at 1644-45. 
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Speaking of tort law, I've wondered if there is 
scholarly potential in a related issue. I have read of a box 
of nails that says-and I swear I did not make this up-
"CAUTION! Do NOT swallow nails! May cause 
irritation!"46 If that sort of idiocy becomes prevalent, does 
it form a new custom and thus a new standard of reasonable 
care that exposes the nail-maker who fails to include the 
warning to tort liability? If the dry cleaner has a sign that 
says, "Not responsible for lost shirts," is that the final word 
on the matter? Is it even relevant to determining liability if 
they lose your shirt? One of my favorite examples of this 
sort of thing is a sign on the back of a truck that was 
transporting small rocks and gravel. 47 It says, "Not 
responsible for broken windshield," and "Caution-stay 
back over 100 feet-not responsible for road objects." 
Setting aside the fact that you have to be much closer than 
one hundred feet to even read the sign, what is the legal 
effect of this assertion? 
We see this same declarative overreach in 
intellectual property too. I've wondered for a long time 
whether another contributor to rights accretion is the 
ridiculously broad public statements that rightsholders 
make about their rights. The most familiar may be the one 
that closes NFL broadcasts: "This telecast is copyrighted by 
the NFL for the private use of our audience. Any other use 
of this telecast or of any pictures, descriptions, or accounts 
of the game without the NFL 's consent is prohibited" (A 
very similar statement comes at the end of every CBS 
broadcast of March Madness.) To which I say, seriously? 
I am prohibited from publicly describing the game, or 
giving an account of what happened? It's a moronic 
46 Jane Easter Bahls, Better Safe ... , ENTREPRENEUR, July 1, 2003, at 
76. 
47 Photo on file with the author. I promise that I was not driving when 
I took the picture. 
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statement on its face, but its repet1t10n probably has an 
effect on viewers and helps them form overbroad 
impressions of the reach of copyright. 
These overbroad public claims were something I 
mentioned in a footnote, 48 but I think it might be worth an 
article all on its own, one that goes beyond intellectual 
property but uses intellectual property as an example. 
Maybe call it Public Declarations of Private Law. 49 Now, 
one might argue that these are contractual provisions, 
which is the kind of argument that led me to start writing 
about boilerplate; all the careful incentive/access balancing 
done in intellectual property law could be undone if courts 
have unrealistic views of what constitutes an enforceable 
contractual term. But the contracts rationale involves some 
tricky questions about assent, so it's an issue worth 
exploring. 
The other potential application I've wondered about 
1s m Fourth Amendment doctrine. Since 1967's United 
States v. Katz case, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has 
used as its lodestar our "reasonable expectations of 
privacy."50 But this invites circularity, as our privacy 
48 Gibson, supra note 1, at 951 n.262; see also id. at 920 n.151 ("As 
one court reluctantly concluded, 'Apparently, in this day and age when 
professional sports teams franchise pennants, teeshirts, helmets, 
drinking glasses and a wide range of other products, a substantial 
number of people believe, if not told otherwise, that one cannot conduct 
[a state lottery based on NFL games] without NFL approval.' NFL v. 
Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Del. 1977)."). For an 
article that focuses on this issue, see Jason Mazzone, Copy.fraud, 
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026 (2006). 
49 In fact, let me try it out right now: "I hereby declare that Public 
Declarations of Private Law is my idea and that any use of it or any 
pictures, descriptions, or accounts of it without my consent is 
prohibited." 
50 See United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). Although the "reasonable expectations" language 
Volume 60- Number 1 
64 IDEA - The Law Review of the Franklin Pierce Center for Intellectual Property 
expectations are formed, at least in part, by what intrusions 
on privacy the law does and does not allow. The circularity 
is particularly evident when technology makes possible 
some new intrusion on privacy; when these intrusions first 
emerge, we may have no expectations one way or the other 
with regard to them-or we might view them as 
unreasonable because they are not an intrusion we've 
encountered before. 
This means that our expectations could essentially 
be manipulated (inadvertently, or not so inadvertently): the 
public starts using a new technology, and does so long 
enough and broadly enough that by the time the 
government uses it to spy on us, we've gotten used to it and 
view it as reasonable, and thus constitutional. For example, 
it would be hard to have gone in one fell swoop from a 
world in which your home was your castle to a world in 
which the police could hover four hundred feet over your 
property and peer through your window, as the government 
was authorized to do in Florida v. Riley. 51 But when the 
privacy intrusions accrete bit by bit, we adjust to them, as 
do our expectations: before Florida v. Riley there was 
California v. Ciraolo, which held that an airplane flyover at 
one thousand feet, which looked directly down at the 
property, was okay. 52 
Indeed, after enough of these sorts of cases, the 
Supreme Court essentially ratified the feedback effect in 
2001, in Kyllo v. United States. 53 In that case, the police 
suspected that Kyllo was using heat lamps to grow 
marijuana indoors, so they used thermal 1magmg 
originated in a concurrence, it has become the prevailing standard. See, 
e.g., Carpenterv. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214-15 (2018). 
51 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
52 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
53 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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technology to peer through the walls of his house and see if 
there were suspiciously high levels of heat anywhere. 54 At 
first, one might think that this case shows a Fourth 
Amendment resistance to the erosion of privacy via 
newfangled technologies, because Kyllo won the case-the 
Court held that the use of the thermal imaging technology 
was a search and required a warrant. 55 But in fact the 
Court's reasoning buttresses the feedback argument: 
[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology 
any information regarding the home's 
interior that could not otherwise have been 
obtained without physical "intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area" constitutes a 
search-at least where (as here) the 
technology in question is not in general 
bl . 56 pu 1c use. 
So the problem was not the privacy violation 
inherent in the government's peering through our walls 
with some newfangled technology. The problem was that 
the case had hit the courts too soon-not enough time had 
passed for the public to get used to and widely adopt 
thermal imaging equipment. "Don't worry," the Court was 
saying, "if you wait long enough, your rights will erode." 
Once we get used to Amazon's drones coming to our 
doorstep and taking pictures of it, will it really violate our 
expectations of privacy to have the government do the 
same? Oy. 
54 Id. at29-31. 
55 Id. at 40. 
56 Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 
(1961)). 
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IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN PRACTICE 
That covers developments-real and imagined-in 
scholarship. Now back to intellectual property and some 
related developments in practice, by which I mean not just 
litigation but in licensing. It's a mixed bag. Certainly, the 
Copyright Clearance Center was given a huge boost by the 
American Geophysical case, which held that a market for 
personal archiving by academic researchers was likely to be 
developed, 57 thereby making development of such a market 
the only option-transaction costs be damned. 58 And 
although I have described doctrinal feedback as an organic, 
inadvertent process, there's no doubt that it could be 
proactively manipulated by a strategically minded 
rightsholder: offer users sweetheart deals to establish a 
licensing market and then ramp up fees later when it's too 
late to make a plausible fair use claim. I have not delved 
into it, but I suspect that the significant ramp-up in digital 
licensing costs for academic libraries may have originated 
in that kind of strategy. 59 
I think we came perilously close to a really bad 
licensing market in the litigation over the Google Books 
57 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d 
Cir. 1994). 
58 I agree with the dissent in this case that the majority was engaging in 
the very circular reasoning it sought to avoid. See id. at 937 (Jacobs, J., 
dissenting) ("There is a circularity to the problem: the market will not 
crystallize unless courts reject the fair use argument that Texaco 
presents; but, under the statutory test, we cannot declare a use to be an 
infringement unless (assuming other factors also weigh in favor of the 
secondary user) there is a market to be harmed."). 
59 See Stephen Bosch et al., Deal or No Deal: Periodicals Price Survey 
2019, LIBRARY J. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.libraryjournal.co 
m/?detailStory=Deal-or-No-Deal-Periodicals-Price-Survey-2019 [https 
://perma.cc/AX79-ZP8V] (reporting average price increase of six 
percent annually since 2012). 
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project. We now think of the resulting case law as having 
created more space for fair use, and that's true. 60 But that 
was a second-best solution from Google's perspective. 
Long before Google won its fair use cases, it tried to 
convince the court to adopt a settlement that provided for 
licensing-which the court rejected because it would have 
gone beyond the rights at dispute in the case. 61 Had the 
settlement happened, it might have been impossible for any 
other defendant to argue fair use, and equally impossible 
for any other defendant to strike such a licensing deal 
itself. 62 Thankfully, the settlement did not happen, and 
now others can take advantage of the fair use rights that the 
litigation established. 
Fortunately, there are some occasional mavericks 
that push back against the licensing tendency. Right 
around the time the article was published there was the Bill 
Graham Archives v. Darling Kindersley Ltd case, in which 
the Second Circuit noted that "a copyright holder cannot 
prevent others from entering fair use markets merely 'by 
developing or licensing a market for parody, news 
reporting, educational or other transformative uses. "'63 
We've also seen pushback against expansive substantial 
similarity holdings in cases like VMG Salsoul (the 
Madonna case out of the Ninth Circuit), 64 which split from 
60 See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015); 
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTmst, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
61 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
62 I addressed this issue in James Gibson, Accidental Rights, 116 
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 348 (2007) and James Gibson, Opinion, 
Google's New Monopoly, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2008. 
63 Bill Graham Archives v. Darling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 
614-15 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Pub. 
Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 146 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
64 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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the Sixth Circuit's crazy Bridgeport Music decision.65 So I 
may have been too pessimistic about the fate of such 
mavericks, although I think they are probably few and far 
between, and I suspect that the shadow of the clearance 
culture hides a lot of potential mavericks who end up 
cavmg. 
One might also hope that rights accretion would 
also be tempered by a friendlier judicial attitude toward 
liability rules, instead of property rules, bled over from 
patent law. After all, the patent remedies case of eBay v. 
MercExchange cited copyright cases for its holding. 66 But 
empirical work suggests that has not happened,67 and as I 
warned in the paper, it's not clear that that would lead to 
less rights accretion anyway. 68 
V. AIRING OF GRIEVANCES 
Finally, the airing of grievances. I don't really have 
anything serious here, except maybe a lesson for younger 
scholars. My article has been cited a lot in other 
scholarship and in briefs-so cry me a river, right?-but 
it's never been cited by a court, as far as I know. It would 
be nice to be cited by a court. So, if you have a piece of 
scholarship that you think might be of use to courts, and 
you would like to be cited, consider authoring amicus 
briefs. 
65 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (inexplicably reading 17 U.S.C. § 114(a)-a statute that 
explicitly limits the reach of sound recording copyrights-as expanding 
that reach by doing away with the substantial similarity analysis). 
66 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006). 
67 See Jiarui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An Empirical 
Study, 16LEWIS&CLARKL.REv. 215 (2012). 
68 Gibson, supra note 1, at 945-46. 
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Other than that, my only whinging is that I think the 
article had something to say about trademark that has been 
mostly overlooked-or maybe overtaken is the better 
word. The most normatively neutral of the solutions I 
offered for rights accretion was for courts to delve into the 
why, not just the whether, of the relevant markets. 69 In 
trademark, this translates into requiring rightsholders to 
prove that consumer confusion is material to purchasing 
decisions before liability is imposed.70 No one goes to see 
a movie because of the trademarked products in it-so even 
if moviegoers are confused about whether licensing is 
needed in that context, it shouldn't matter. In contrast, 
when it comes to traditional uses of traditional marks, like 
logos on packaging, I think we can assume materiality. Or 
at least the burden should be on the defendant to disprove 
it. 
In the years since the article was published, this 
notion has worked its way into a number of excellent 
articles. 71 And I've usually been cited, but maybe not with 
the acknowledgement that it was an essential moving part 
in my trademark solution for the rights accretion problem. 
Indeed, a recent post on trademark materiality on the 
usually dependable Written Description blog summarized 
all the trademark scholars who had worked on materiality. 72 
69 Id. at 947-50. 
70 Id. at 949-50. 
71 E.g., Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Rethinking Post-
Sale Confusion, 108 TRADEMARK REP. 881 (2018); Rebecca Tushnet, 
Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False 
Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305 (2011); Mark A. Lemley & 
Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 436-46 
(2010). 
72 Camilla Hrdy, Recent Critiques of Post-Sale Confusion: Is 
Materiality the Answer?, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION BLOG (Nov. 11, 2018, 
12:50 PM), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2018/11/recent-criti 
ques-of-post-sale-confusion.html [https://perma.cc/43A5-BPNC]. 
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Except one. Sigh. (To be fair, my article was not as recent 
as the others, and every scholar probably thinks that his or 
her work is more inspirational to others than it really is.) 
So maybe that's a takeaway for younger scholars: if 
you think you have a good idea, flog it. Get it in print early 
and often, and don't worry about writing narrower 
scholarship if that's what it takes to stake a claim and 
expand on an idea that you have theretofore only 
mentioned in passing. I have always tended to wait until I 
have a magnum opus ( or what I think is one) before I 
publish, which probably is not the best way to build a 
career. But who am I to complain? I got picked for the 
Intellectual Property Redux. 
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